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THE IMPACT OF DICTA IN BUCK V. BELL
Hilary Eisenberg
“Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”1
These infamous words are found in Buck v. Bell, a controversial decision
penned in 1927 by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Buck v. Bell, which
upheld a Virginia statute allowing the involuntary sterilization of Carrie
Buck,2 is one of the Supreme Court’s most commonly reviled decisions.3
Despite such strong criticism, Buck v. Bell has never been expressly
overturned and is today, still good law.4 Though legal issues surrounding
reproductive rights fueled contentious debates for the remainder of the
twentieth century,5 federal courts generally decline to address the issue of
sterilization on a substantive level. 6 Despite increased protections of
personal rights as a result of the Supreme Court’s expansion of the right to
privacy, a judicial trend has emerged shifting involuntary sterilization
controversies into state courts.7 This trend is currently exemplified by the
recent case of Mary Moe, where in February of 2012, a Massachusetts judge
handed down a decision ordering an abortion and sterilization of a severely
schizophrenic pregnant woman. 8 Following some controversy, 9 the
Massachusetts Appeals Court quickly overturned this decision. 10 The
expansion of the right to privacy, and the varied state standards for
involuntary sterilization that emerged during a mass revision over the later

	
  
1. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
2. Id. at 205-07.
3. Jennifer M. Klein, Compensating Victims of Forced Sterilization: Lessons from
North Carolina, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 422, 423 (2012).
4. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942). Though Buck v. Bell was
addressed by Skinner v. Oklahoma, it was only distinguished and not expressly
overturned.
5. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).
7. See infra Part II, notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
8. In re Guardianship of Moe, 960 N.E.2d 350, 353-54 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012).
9. Staci Zaretsky, Quote of the Day: This is American Jurisprudence, ABOVE THE
LAW (Feb. 22, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/quote-of-the-day-thisis-american-jurisprudence/.
10. In re Guardianship of Moe, 960 N.E.2d at 354-55.
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twentieth century, indicate that Justice Holmes’ endorsement of eugenic
sterilization is now merely dicta.11
This note seeks to explore various state standards for determining if a
mentally disabled person is incompetent in terms of reproductive rights.
Part I is a discussion of the evolution of federal case law covering the rights
of individuals concerning reproductive freedom. It provides an overview of
the attitudes courts have taken addressing reproductive rights following Buck
v. Bell. Part II of the note reviews how involuntary sterilization cases are
handled on the state level. This section discusses in further detail the three
main approaches taken by state courts. Through analysis of the underlying
policy motivations of these approaches, this section explores the legal
evolution of sterilization standards to include an expanded interpretation of
substantive due process with a focused inclusion on the fundamental right to
privacy. Part III focuses on the modern state of legal reconciliation of due
process rights with sterilization guidelines using the details of the recent
Massachusetts involuntary sterilization case, Guardianship of Moe to
exemplify the continued emphasis on procedural due process rights. Finally,
Part IV discusses how, as a result of various state interpretations, the legal
trend towards allowing standards for administering involuntary sterilization
actually fits in with the general message of Buck v. Bell in terms of its strong
emphasis on procedural safeguards. Part IV contends that the arguments
expressly endorsing eugenic sterilization are purely dicta, and not binding
authority. This discussion leads to the conclusion that in light of the varying
state standards for sterilization of incompetent persons, the precedent in
Buck v. Bell binds later society to enforce the protections of both procedural
and substantive due process. At this point, this note explains that the Buck v.
Bell precedent is not, in fact, binding law endorsing eugenic sterilization.
I. EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY ON STERILIZATION AND
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
In Buck v. Bell, plaintiff Carrie Buck, an eighteen-year-old woman
described as “feeble minded,” challenged a 1924 Virginia statute that
authorized the superintendent of the State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble
Minded to order her sterilization.12 Carrie Buck’s mother and illegitimate
child were also described as “feeble minded.” 13 This statute permitted
superintendents of institutions for the mentally impaired to require
individuals to be sterilized if they found that it is “for the best interest of the
patients and of society.”14 The legislative aim of this statute was to promote

	
  
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part IV, notes 264-309 and accompanying text.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
Id.
Id. at 206.
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the health and welfare of the mentally impaired persons and to protect
society by preventing such individuals from procreating.15
In the case of Carrie Buck, State Colony followed the procedural
guidelines of the Virginia statute precisely as they were written.16 After the
superintendent filed his petition and presented the written evidence in favor
of her sterilization, Carrie Buck was granted her hearing and allowed to
appeal, as the statute stipulated.17 However, the focus in Buck v. Bell “is not
upon the procedure but upon the substantive law.”18 In response to the
contention on Carrie Buck’s behalf that there could be no justification for
the sterilization order, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously wrote:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could
not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those concerned,
in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is
better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
their kind. . . . Three generations of imbeciles are enough.19
This opinion effectively allowed states to create laws allowing
compulsory sterilization of mentally challenged people, and has never been
overturned.
Justice Holmes’ line of reasoning clearly endorses eugenicist principles in
the opinion’s justification for compulsory sterilization.20 It is important to
note that at the time of the Buck v. Bell opinion, more progressive segments
of society saw eugenics-based policies such as the Virginia statute as a
means of societal reform, and not oppressive intrusions into the rights of the
mentally disabled.21 At that point in time, scientific misinterpretations of
Gregory Mendel’s work22 understood hereditary genetic traits to include

	
  
15. Id. at 205-06.
16. Id. at 207.
17. Id. at 205-06.
18. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
19. Id.
20. Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive
Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE L.J. 806, 810-11 (1986).
21. Scott, supra note 20, at 810-11 n.14.
22. Gregory Mendel is generally regarded as the founder of modern genetics. His
works were not discovered or considered credible until after his death. See Deciphering
the Genetic Code: Gregor Mendel: The Father of Modern Genetics, NAT’L INSTITUTE
HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/nirenberg/HS1_mendel.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2013).
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cognitive and psychological qualities.23 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
decided Buck v. Bell in 1927, almost a decade before Nazi Germany’s
exercise of eugenicist policies in carrying out mass mandatory sterilizations
drew the widespread condemnation with which society is now familiar.24
Following Buck v. Bell, compulsory sterilizations increased exponentially
throughout the 1930’s.25 These forced sterilizations no longer targeted only
the mentally impaired, as the criterion expanded to include “unwed mothers,
prostitutes, petty criminals, and children with disciplinary problems.”26 This
trend of involuntary sterilizations, however, declined by the end of the
twentieth century due to “advances in medicine and social science [that]
increasingly undermined the justifications for the sterilization movement.”27
However, while Buck v. Bell is technically still good law, subsequent
Supreme Court rulings indicated a metamorphosis in societal attitude
towards reproductive freedom.
A. Distinguishing Buck v. Bell
Just over a decade after the Buck v. Bell decision was handed down, the
Supreme Court, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, struck down an Oklahoma law
requiring compulsory sterilization for persons with more than two
convictions for felonious offenses to be sterilized.28 While Skinner is often
credited as the only case to expressly distinguish Buck v. Bell, it did not
expressly overrule it.29 Although both Skinner and Buck v. Bell address
compulsory sterilization statutes, analysis in Skinner takes a narrower focus,
pertaining only to punitive sterilization of criminals and avoids discussion
on the ethics of forcibly sterilizing the mentally ill.30 Skinner not only
sidesteps addressing Buck v. Bell by narrowly focusing on punitive
sterilization, but it also applies a heavier focus on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.31 While Buck v. Bell dismisses Carrie
Buck’s equal protection contentions,32 Skinner focuses primarily on the

	
  
23. Phillip Thompson, Silent Protest: A Catholic Justice Dissents in Buck v. Bell, 43
CATH. LAW. 125, 130 (2004).
24. Scott, supra note 20, at 811.
25. Thompson, supra note 23, at 143-44. (noting that during the 1930’s, between two
thousand to four thousand people were involuntarily sterilized each year).
26. Thompson, supra note 23, at 144.
27. Thompson, supra note 23, at 144.
28. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535-36 (1942).
29. Id. at 538.
30. Buck v. Bell, 247 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
31. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 540-541.
32. Id. at 541.
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equal protection issues presented, and the Court applied a more rigorous
strict scrutiny test in its analysis of the Oklahoma statute.33
The Equal Protection Clause is found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The text reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge any
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.34
In Skinner, the Oklahoma statute exempted certain offenses, such as
embezzlement and political offenses, from convictions that would count
towards punitive sterilization. 35 The Supreme Court reasoned that the
statute’s distinction between different types of felonies allows for a law that
does not apply equally to a category of people, as it appears to apply only to
certain types of criminals on an arbitrary and overly subjective basis.36
Consequently, upholding this law would have essentially allowed the state of
Oklahoma to deprive its citizens of their reproductive right haphazardly.37
The Court in Skinner found that by exempting embezzlement but including
larceny, the law applied unequal legal standards to “those who have
committed intrinsically the same quality of offense,”38 in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.39 While the Court does comment briefly on the
lack of procedural protections found in the Oklahoma statute as a violation
of procedural due process, it refuses the opportunity to analyze the matter,
suggesting an implied indication of the Supreme Court’s refusal to expressly
address Buck v. Bell.40
The Supreme Court limited its focus in Skinner v. Oklahoma to punitive
sterilization.41 This, along with the decision’s emphasis on equal protection
claims prove Skinner v. Oklahoma is fairly limited in distinguishing Buck v.
Bell. Skinner’s focus on sterilization as punishment separates it from the
issue of compulsory sterilization statutes in terms of the Court’s originative
public policy aims, which allowed the Court to rule on Skinner without
extensively addressing Buck v. Bell. 42 The Skinner Court limits its

	
  
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Skinner, 316 U.S. at 537.
Id. at 538-39.
Id. at 541.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1942).
Id.
Id. at 541.
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comparisons with Buck v. Bell considerably, asserting that because the
Virginia statute at issue in Buck v. Bell applied to “feeble-minded”
individuals in relevant institutions of the state, the law was less arbitrary in
enforcement and covered a relatively discrete class of citizens.43 Through an
equal protection approach, Skinner manages to avoid addressing underlying
questions of eugenic intent in legally significant detail.44
A comprehensive understanding of the evolution of involuntary
sterilization law following Skinner on a federal level requires an
appreciation of the societal and legal contexts serving as the background to
such decisions. Supreme Court approaches in interpreting the scope of
many Constitutional protections constantly evolve, accounting for varied
legal approaches that are often dependent upon trends in jurisprudence most
dominant at the time of a specific decision. 45 Such evolution in legal
interpretation is particularly evident in examining the history of Supreme
Court approaches to the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 Civil
rights and personal protections under the Fourteenth Amendment have
grown considerably in protective scope from its addition to the Constitution
in 1868, both in terms of rights covered, and protective mechanisms.47 Prior
to the 1930’s, the Supreme Court was reluctant to employ protections under
the Equal Protection Clause, and instead relied on the Due Process Clause to
protect personal rights and liberties.48 Buck v. Bell, decided in 1927, is
reflective of this judicial trend, evident in Justice Holmes’ condemnation of
the Equal Protection Clause as the “usual last resort of constitutional
arguments.”49 In the context of the Supreme Court’s shift towards reliance
on the Equal Protection Clause, it is easier to see, contextually, why the
Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, decided in 1942, was more inclined to take an
equal protection approach.
The effects of World War II and the policies of the German Nazi party
also account for the reluctance of the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma to
address the eugenics issues present in compulsory sterilization statutes
further than a vague reference. While in Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes
zealously supported involuntary sterilization as a means of reducing the

	
  
43. Id.
44. See generally Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (where the Court
acknowledges Buck v. Bell but focuses on the equal protection issue and does not
mention eugenic policies).
45. Dennis J. Hutchinson, A Century of Social Reform: The Judicial Role, 4 THE
GREEN BAG 2D 157 (2001).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 157, 164.
48. Id. at 161; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
49. Hutchinson, supra note 45, at 163.
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burden of disabled persons on society, it is important to note that these
words were written in 1927.50 The Virginia statute under scrutiny in Buck v.
Bell was enacted in 1924.51 It was not until 1933 that Adolf Hitler came to
power in Germany, and not until 1939 that he used eugenic policies.52 As
these policies included mass sterilization under similarly worded law, it was
not until ten years later that these polices were part of the scope of Nazi
administered genocide and other horrific crimes against humanity.53 Thus,
Justice Holmes wrote his opinion over a decade before the prime of the Nazi
regime and the Holocaust, and therefore when eugenic policies did not carry
such negative and volatile connotations.54 Further, such policy motives had
many supporters in higher courts, including Justice Holmes himself. 55
While eugenics was not, at the time of the Buck v. Bell decision, at the
height of popularity in the scientific community, it had yet to attain the
public revulsion later acquired in connection with gruesome Nazi policies.56
Similarly, this historical context explains to a degree why later courts might
be hesitant to address Holmes’ argument in favor of sterilizing the mentally
disabled for the overall welfare of society. Therefore, it follows from this
context, that the Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma, faced with a decision
involving compulsory sterilization in the early 1940’s in the midst of World
War II, was reluctant to address such an emotionally charged and socially
divisive issue.57

	
  
50.
51.
52.

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Id. at 205.
See Nazi Persecution of the Disabled: Murder of the Unfit, U.S. HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/focus/disabilities/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2013).
53. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: A New Light on Buck v.
Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30 (1985); see M. Cranach, The Killing of Psychiatric Patients in
Nazi Germany Between 1939-1945, ISR. J. OF PSYCHIATRY RELATED SCI. 1, 8-18 (2003).
See also Nazi Persecution of the Disabled: Murder of the Unfit, U.S. HOLOCAUST
MEMORIAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/focus/disabilities/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2013). During his regime in World War II, Adolf Hitler created mass
policies ordering the sterilization of classes in his population considering undesirable.
Included in these policies were the mentally ill as well as the physically and mentally
disabled. Under these policies, mass sterilization was administered by direction of the
state, resulting in the sterilization of a large number of disabled persons.
54. Thompson, supra note 21, at 142.
55. Id.
56. Maura McIntyre, Buck v. Bell and Beyond: A Revised Standard to Evaluate the
Best Interests of the Mentally Disabled in the Sterilization Context, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
1303, 1308 (2007).
57. Id. at 1308.
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The reluctance of Skinner and other later courts to address Justice
Holmes’ eugenics-based argument was not entirely the result of the
increasingly critical view of eugenics in light of Nazi abuse of sterilization
law. Advancements in genetics, medicine, and science further contributed to
the decline of the eugenics movement,58 which had already been becoming
more limited in its application even around the time of the Buck v. Bell
decision.59 It follows naturally, then, in light of such advancements, that
American society would become less likely to support the sterilization of
the mentally disabled or ill.
B. Supreme Court Silence on Compulsory Sterilization
Since Buck v. Bell and Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court has
declined to address involuntary sterilization statutes explicitly.
In
conjunction with substantial scientific advances in medicine and a general
decline of the eugenics movement, most eugenic sterilization statutes aimed
at the mentally ill or mentally disabled have since been repealed.60 While, as
recently as 1988, fourteen states still had eugenic sterilization statutes,61 four
have since been repealed, and none are currently in active use.62
Additionally, relevant federal case law over the twentieth century
indicated a trend towards legal protection of reproductive privacy as a
fundamental right. 63 Modern jurisprudence has indicated a legal trend
towards analyzing cases where involuntary sterilization is sought within the

	
  
58. Id. at 1308. See also Eric M. Jaegers, Modern Judicial Treatment of Procreative
Rights of Developmentally Disabled Persons: Equal Rights to Procreation and
Sterilization, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 947, 951 (1993).
59. Thompson, supra note 23, at 125, 142. In 1923, the Supreme Court declined to
endorse an attempt to use state power designed to “enhance the mental health of [state
citizens]” in declaring a Nebraska statute preventing public schools from teaching
German unconstitutional on grounds that this violated due process by limiting
educational endeavors. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923).
60. Scott, supra note 20, at 812 n.18. There were twenty-eight eugenic sterilization
statutes reported to be law on the state books in 1956, which the states began to repeal in
the 1960s. By the mid-1980’s most of eugenic sterilization statutes were repealed.
61. George P. Smith, Limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally
Handicapped, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 71, 77 n.35 (1988).
62. Kevlin B. O’Reilly, Confronting Eugenics: Does the Now Discredited Practice
Have Relevance to Today’s Technology?, AM. MED. NEWS, (July 9, 2007),
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2007/07/09/prsa0709.htm.
63. Scott, supra note 20, at 813 n. 25.
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legal framework of the fundamental right to privacy and protection of
individual reproductive rights.64
Since statutes concerning sterilization of the mentally incompetent are
found in state law, the Supreme Court generally declines to address cases of
involuntary sterilization.65 However, following a mass repeal of eugenics
era sterilization statutes by many states in the 1960’s and 1970’s, legal
authority on the issue was unclear in many jurisdictions.66 In many cases,
states did not provide alternative guidelines after their outdated compulsory
sterilization laws were repealed, resulting in an absence of statutory
authority on the matter.67 Though this created a legal grey area following
the mass repeal of sterilization statutes, as evidenced by 1978’s decision,
Stump v. Sparkman, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity to address
the substantive legal issues regarding reproductive rights of incompetent
persons, choosing to leave the decisions to the individual states and focus on
the limits of judicial immunity in their authority.68 In Stump v. Sparkman, a
mother had her “somewhat retarded” minor daughter sterilized in 1971
without the daughter’s knowledge or consent, after obtaining legal approval
through a petition presented to an Indiana Circuit Court. 69 After the
daughter later married and could not conceive, she discovered the

	
  
64. Scott, supra note 20, at 810. Cases involving medical permanent sterilization
procedures have focused mainly on the right of mentally ill or mentally disabled people
to privacy and their required consent where parents, guardians, or other legal caregivers
seek to obtain permanent medical treatments, often sterilization, on their behalf. The right
of adults who have no such disabilities or illnesses to obtain sterilization has been
addressed infrequently in the circuits and at the state level, but not by the Supreme Court.
Presently, sterilization procedures in an involuntary context are generally largely issues
of guardianship and ability to consent. See generally In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474
(N.J. 1981); In re Guardianship of Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641-642 (Wash. 1980) (en
banc); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1378 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
65. The last case the Supreme Court addressed involving involuntary sterilization
was Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), where the Court focused solely on the
issue of judicial immunity and did not discuss the involuntary sterilization as a legal
issue. See Beverly Horsburgh, Schrdegreesodinger’s Cat, Eugenics, and the Compulsory
Sterilization of Welfare Mothers: Deconstructing an Old/New Rhetoric and Constructing
the Reproductive Right to Natality for Low-Income Women of Color, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
531, 569-70 (1996).
66. Scott, supra note 20, at 814. See also Christine Ryan, Revisiting Legal Standards
that Govern Requests to Sterilize Profoundly Incompetent Children: In Light of the
“Ashley Treatment,” is a New Standard Appropriate?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV 287, 308-09
(2008).
67. Scott, supra note 20, at 810, 814 n.31.
68. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 361 (1978).
69. Id.
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sterilization and sued the Indiana judge who approved the petition.70 When
the petition was approved in 1971, there was no statutory authority
governing sterilization of incompetent persons or minors, and no case law
existed prohibiting submission and judicial approval of such a petition.71
Because there was no statute to challenge, the issue to be decided concerned
the scope of the judge’s judicial immunity in granting the petition, which
required a judge to have acted within his jurisdiction when claiming
immunity. .72 The Supreme Court found that because there was no statute or
prohibitive case law on the matter, the jurisdiction was broad enough to
include the circuit court judge.73 Though the Supreme Court indicated that
the judge did err as a matter of law, it declined commentary on sterilization
laws for incompetent persons.74 Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the
issue of proper jurisdiction, and ruled that legal error notwithstanding the
judge had judicial immunity because he was within his jurisdiction to rule on
the matter .75
The absence of commentary by the Court on the substance of statutes
governing the sterilization of minors or incompetent persons indicates the
Court’s growing unwillingness as the century progressed to address cases
involving involuntary sterilization on a federal level.76 Comparing this case
to Buck v. Bell, it is of substantial impact that Justice White did not take the
opportunity to comment on acceptable societal or individual needs for
sterilization, as Justice Holmes did in great detail.77 While in Stump v.
Sparkman there was no actual statute to evaluate, the Court did insinuate that
it was likely that the judge did not extend procedural due process to the
woman in question whereas Buck v. Bell discussed an existing Virginia
statute. 78 The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to comment on the
issues a violation of procedural due process might present and the interests a
judge should consider in evaluating a petition. This, along with the strict

	
  
70. Id.
71. Id. at 358.
72. Id. at 354-55.
73. Id. at 359-60.
74. See Horsburgh, supra note 65 at 569-70.
75. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1978).
76. Horsburgh, supra note 65, at 570.
77. Compare Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 356-60 (where Justice White focuses on judicial
immunity), with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207-08 (where Justice Holmes engages in a
lengthy discussion about the ethical implications of compulsory sterilization as a societal
good).
78. Id. They insinuated potential violation of the sterilized woman’s right to due
process in making their point that such a violation does not, if made in the appropriate
jurisdiction, violate judicial immunity.
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focus on judicial immunity, indicates that the Supreme Court’s approach
shifted to decline federal interpretation in regard to sterilization policies.
C. Shift Towards Expansion of the Right to Privacy
Simultaneously, with its silence on compulsory sterilization law as state
legislatures repealed their eugenic sterilization statutes en masse, the
Supreme Court released a series of decisions that confirmed both the
existence and protection of a fundamental right to privacy in a number of
areas. 79 Over the past century, the Supreme Court has expanded
fundamental rights through an interpretation of the Constitution to include
rights not explicitly stated in the text, but found in the penumbra of specific
protections stated in the Bill of Rights. 80 Through this interpretative
approach, the Supreme Court found privacy to be a fundamental right
subject to Constitutional protection, even though privacy is not directly
mentioned in the text.81 This fundamental right to privacy was expanded to
protect many reproductive rights, including marriage, contraception,
termination of pregnancy, and procreation.82 Over the latter half of the
twentieth century, this expansion of the right to privacy led to the
development of the constitutional right to reproductive privacy and now
requires a revision of the analytical approach used in assessing the
constitutionality of laws governing sterilization of the incompetent.83
Continuing the legal trend expanding protections under the right to
privacy, the Supreme Court declared a statute prohibiting use by or
distribution of contraception to married couples unconstitutional because it
violated the fundamental right to privacy in the 1965 decision Griswold v.
Connecticut. 84 Holding that the guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbra inclusive of the right to privacy, the Court found that the

	
  
79. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 208. See Scott,
supra note 20, at 811.
80. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
81. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
82. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (where the court recognized the right to privacy extends
to a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, though this right is not unlimited);
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (where the court extended the right to privacy to reproductive
decisions within marriage, striking down a Connecticut law withholding contraceptives
from marriage); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (where the court extends
the ruling from Griswold to apply also to unmarried couples, including the right to
contraceptives as within the right to privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(where the court extended the right to privacy to include the right to marriage, striking
down a state law prohibiting interracial marriage).
83. Scott, supra note 20, at 811 n.17.
84. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
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Connecticut statute improperly regulated marriage, a “relationship within the
zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.”85
In 1972, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird expanded that holding to
encompass unmarried persons, reasoning that such an expansion was
necessary on equal protection grounds.86
In perhaps the most recognizable right to privacy case, the controversial
1972 decision in Roe v. Wade determined that the fundamental right to
privacy extends to protect a woman’s decision to end a pregnancy. 87
According to the Court’s reasoning, the right to this specific privacy extends
from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty, which reads, “nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property.”88 The Court,
however, acknowledged some acceptable limitations on the right to end a
pregnancy, including when a state’s interests in “safeguarding health, in
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life . . . become
sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the . .
. decision.”89 The decision in Roe v. Wade invalidated the Texas state law
prohibiting all abortions outright. 90 Following Roe, numerous state and
federal courts struck down abortion statutes as unconstitutional violations of
a woman’s right to privacy.91
Since the Court in Roe, Griswold, and Eisenstadt determined the freedom
to terminate a pregnancy and to access contraception are fundamental rights,
state laws imposing limitations on such rights are subject to strict scrutiny
under judicial review.92 Under the strict scrutiny analysis, any law limiting a
fundamental right is unconstitutional unless it serves a compelling state
interest to which the legislation is narrowly tailored to address.93 Legal
classifications of reproductive rights as fundamental under the right to
privacy casts Buck v. Bell in a new light.94 When Buck v. Bell was decided
in 1927, reproductive autonomy was not yet afforded its more recent

	
  
85. Id. at 484-85.
86. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54.
87. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
90. Id. at 166.
91. See generally Paul Benjamin Linton, The Legal Status of Abortion in the United
States if Roe v. Wade is Overruled, 23 ISSUES L. & MED. 3 (2007).
92. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938)
(demonstrating where the various standards of review were introduced, outlining a higher
level of scrutiny for laws infringing on a fundamental right in violation of a
Constitutional provision).
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,155 (1973). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967).
94. Scott, supra note 20, at 811 n.17.

196

The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy

Vol. XXX:1

protections as a fundamental right. Furthermore, case law developing
standards of heightened scrutiny under judicial review was not introduced
until 1938, 95 or fully articulated by the court until 1944. 96 As a legal
framework for considering violations of equal protection or due process,
strict scrutiny as a standard was not applied in case law until 1967. 97
Therefore, in understanding Buck v. Bell, it is important to note that because
case law had yet to develop higher standards of scrutiny, any equal
protection analysis by Justice Holmes was limited to the only standard of
review available, the rational basis test.98
II. STATE STANDARDS FOR STERILIZATION
“Currently, courts adopt one of three rules to determine whether to grant a
petition for sterilization of any individual deemed incompetent for the
purpose of giving informed consent to the procedure: (i) the substituted
judgment standard, (ii) the minority criteria rule, or (iii) the discretionary
best interest standard.”99 These standards are based on rulings found in case
law, and evolved from “selectively adopting case law of other similarly
situated states’.” 100 Therefore, outcomes in such cases have become
unpredictable.101 The variability of these outcomes is not restricted to the
discrepancies between varied state statutes, as outcomes can differ on similar
cases within one jurisdiction alone.102
Despite the varied objectives evident in the approaches taken by the three
rules, all require extensive procedural legwork103 creating strict standards

	
  
95. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
96. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
97. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
98. Since Buck v. Bell was decided in 1927, there was no form of heightened scrutiny
for the courts to apply in analyzing the constitutionality of this statute, since strict
scrutiny was not developed until Korematsu over a decade later, nor applied until 1967 in
Loving v. Virginia. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1967).
99. McIntyre, supra note 56, at 1311-12.
100. Id. at 1312.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1311-12. The substituted judgment standard, for example, has been applied
in cases involving once competent and never competent individuals. Compare In re
Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981) (which involves a woman who has had Down
Syndrome since birth), with In re Guardianship of Moe, 960 N.E.2d 350, 352-53 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2012) (concerning a once-competent woman who became mentally ill upon
adulthood).
103. Most state procedures for ordering an involuntary sterilization require multiple
steps, including medical and psychiatric evaluations, court hearings, and several levels of
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and placing the odds strongly against sterilization.104 These state-level cases
requiring extensive procedural legwork are decided similarly to that in Buck
v. Bell, as the focus is not on the existence of procedural protections for the
rights of the mentally impaired person, but instead on the adequacy of such
procedures and their enforcement.105 Challenges to sterilization provisions
addressing substantive issues arising from the content or intent of the
statutes, as addressed to some extent in Buck v. Bell,106 have not since been
addressed on a federal level. This, perhaps, is illustrative of why varied
standards have evolved to produce fairly unpredictable results. While the
justifications of modern state standards are generally tailored to reflect the
best interests of the incompetent person, this presents a broad arena for
interpretation, leading to such variable outcomes.107
A. Substituted Judgment Standard
The substituted judgment standard seeks to preserve fundamental liberties
by assigning a surrogate to an incompetent person and “[allowing] a court to
render a decision consistent with the decision the patient would have made if
capable.”108 This standard originated in case law in 1976, when the New
Jersey Supreme Court in In re Quinlan allowed the guardian of a patient in a
permanent unconscious state to exercise the right to decline potentially
lifesaving medical procedures on behalf of the patient.109 In order to protect
the constitutional right to decline lifesaving medical procedures, the father of
a permanently incompetent woman was permitted to decide whether or not
to sustain life support. 110 While many states subsequently adopted this

	
  
court ordered investigation by various professionals. See DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 16, § 5712
(2013); N.C. GEN STAT. § 35A-1245 (2012).
104. A plethora of procedural safeguards are available to protect the best interest of
the disabled, creating a tough procedural hurdle to overcome before procuring
sterilization. See William A. Krais, The Incompetent Developmentally Disabled Person’s
Right of Self-Determination: Right-to-Die, Sterilization and Institutionalization, 15 AM. J.
L. & MED. 333, 335-38 (1989).
105. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
106. Id. While Justice Holmes’ opinion begins with a focus on the procedural
protections afforded by the Virginia statute, he also addresses the justifications for such a
mandatory sterilization statute in his discussion of the burden of the disabled on society.
107. See infra Part II, Sections A-C.
108. Krais, supra note 104, at 343-44. Norman L. Cantor, The Relation Between
Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 37, 38 (2004).
109. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976).
110. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 670-71.
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approach, 111 the New Jersey court in In re Grady declined to extend
application of the doctrine to involuntary sterilization of the mentally
incompetent.112
In Grady, the parents of Lee Ann Grady, a 19-year-old girl born with
Down Syndrome, brought the case after Morristown Memorial Hospital
refused an operation sterilizing their daughter.113 Lee Ann’s inability to
significantly comprehend the consequences of sexual relationships or
pregnancy or care for a child was undisputed. 114 Additionally, it was
uncontroverted that Lee Ann was likely to require “lifetime supervision to
care for her own needs.”115 Recognizing her limitations, Lee Ann’s parents’
long-term plan was to place her in a group home for mentally retarded
adults, but only if they could ensure Lee Ann would not accidentally
conceive.116
After the hospital in Grady refused to perform the sterilization without
court authorization, Lee Ann’s parents filed a complaint and subsequently,
the trial judge assigned a guardian ad litem to represent Lee Ann in judicial
proceedings. 117 During this time, Lee Ann also underwent medical and
psychological expert evaluations. 118 After considering testimony from
involved persons and experts, analyzing evaluative reports, and meeting with
Lee Ann herself, the trial judge created a five-part standard for determining
whether or not the court should authorize sterilization.119 The trial court’s
standard addressed the extent of the individual’s incompetency, the best
interests of the incompetent with respect to reproductive choices, and the
application of procedural safeguards as stipulated by the statute. 120
Concluding that Lee Ann met the conditions imposed by this standard, the
trial judge authorized the sterilization.121 However, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey later rejected the lower court’s five-part standard stating that it
allowed for potential judicial abuse; and therefore imposed a modified
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version of the trial court’s standard that included a stricter set of
requirements.122
In Grady, the higher court modified and supplemented the trial court’s
standard, first, by determining that it is the duty of the court, not the parents,
to decide whether or not sterilization is necessary.123 After endorsing the
trial court’s procedures in reaching the previous standard,124 it ruled that “the
trial judge must find that the individual lacks capacity to make a decision
about sterilization and that the incapacity is not likely to change in the
foreseeable future.”125 Finally, considering a non-exhaustive list of factors
which include the possibility of pregnancy, likelihood of sexual activity,
feasibility of less permanent contraceptive methods, the person’s
understanding of the reproductive process, and overall ability to provide
adequate childcare,126 the standard required a finding that there is “clear and
convincing proof that sterilization is in the incompetent person’s best
interests.”127 Applying these standards, the New Jersey Supreme Court was
unable to conclude that sterilization was within Lee Ann’s best interest.128
Instead, the court held that sterilization was premature because there was no
reasonable likelihood of Lee Ann becoming sexually active in the near
future.129
Though the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the substituted judgment
standard, other states do employ this approach. Through In re Moe, a case
concerning a severely mentally retarded adult woman, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court implemented the substituted judgment standard rejected in
Grady.130 The court in Moe first set down procedural safeguards uniform to
all sterilization standards, which required appointing a guardian ad litem,
evaluations by medical and psychological experts, and a declaration that the
person was legally incompetent to make reproductive decisions. 131 In
accordance with the substituted judgment approach, the judge must, based
on the evidence from the expert reports and guardian ad litem, “attempt to
ascertain the ward’s actual preference for sterilization, parenthood, or other
means of contraception . . . [to arrive at] the same decision that would be

	
  
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 481-82.
Id. at 482.
In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 482 (N.J. 1981).
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made by the incompetent person.”132 Essentially, the substituted judgment
standard attempts to work within the procedural framework to ascertain the
wishes of an incompetent person.
Supporters of substituted judgment standard contend that this standard
best incorporates the wishes of the incompetent individual into the ultimate
determination.133 While they do concede that the standard may allow for
unwise decisions, they argue that this equalizes the incompetent with the
competent, since competent people are generally held to imprudent decisions
without judgment.134 Conversely, critics find the standard to be logically
flawed because it asks the decision maker to ascertain what the incompetent
person would choose if competent. 135 This logical fallacy is therefore
thought to be dangerous in that it essentially asks the decision maker to
decide from the viewpoint of someone who was never competent
originally.136 No matter how the decision maker decides, it is impossible to
ensure that they reached the same decision that the mentally impaired person
would have reached were they able to choose for themselves, implying a
strong possibility that the decision rendered is not in the impaired
individual’s best interest.137 Finally, since there is no way to fully remove
the personal beliefs or preferences of the surrogate decision maker from the
equation, accuracy cannot be ensured.138
The substituted judgment standard presents practical complications with
reference to differentiating between those who became incompetent after
living competently for some time, and those who have never experienced
competency. 139 While most cases dealing with the sterilization of
incompetent persons concern those who are born with profound mental
disabilities,140 cases do arise concerning sterilization of persons who later
became incompetent by means of brain damage or severe mental illness.141
The difficulty in reconciling substituted judgment standards for persons who
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have never been competent with the formerly competent contributes to the
reluctance of many courts to adopt such standards.142
B. Mandatory Criteria Rule
In 1980, Washington State created the mandatory criteria approach in
their landmark decision In re Guardianship of Hayes.143 The facts in Hayes
are similar to those in Grady, where the parents of a 19-year-old woman
with Down Syndrome sought to obtain a sterilization for their daughter.144
The mother of Edith Hayes, a severely mentally retarded sixteen-year-old,
petitioned the Superior Court of Washington to authorize Edith’s
sterilization145 Edith, though physically developed normally and capable of
conception, “function[ed] at the level of a 4- or 5-year-old.”146 Though Edith
was alleged to be sexually active, she did not have the mental capacity to
logically connect sexual activity with her reproductive capacity.147
The Washington Supreme Court first discusses relevant factors in
sterilization decisions before setting down its own procedural guidelines for
authorizing sterilizations. 148 After emphasizing the seriousness and
permanence of sterilization procedures,149 the court finds that sterilization
can occasionally be in the best interest of an incompetent person. 150
However, the procedural framework is rigid:
The decision can only be made in a superior court proceeding in
which (1) the incompetent individual is represented by a
disinterested guardian ad litem, (2) the court has received
independent advice based on a comprehensive medical,
psychological, and social evaluation of the individual, and (3) to
the greatest extent possible, the court has elicited and taken into
account the view of the incompetent individual.151
Following this framework, “the judge must first find by clear, cogent and
convincing evidence that the individual is (1) incapable of making his or her
own decision about sterilization, and (2) unlikely to develop sufficiently to
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make an informed judgment about sterilization in the foreseeable future.”152
Additionally, the petitioner for sterilization must prove a demonstrated need
for contraception exists.153 Sterilization is granted only if sterilization is the
only contraceptive option. 154 While the court in Hayes recognized the
stringency of their required burden of proof,155 they found Edith did not
meet their requirements for sterilization. Specifically, no sufficient evidence
proved conclusively that sterilization was the only feasible form of
contraception, or that Edith would categorically be incapable of good
parenting.156
Advocates of the mandatory criteria approach argue the standard’s
stringency is a protective advantage because it allows minimal exercise of
judicial discretion.157 Advocates also contend its inflexibility protects an
incompetent person’s privacy interests from arbitrary and unfair outcomes
that might result under broader judicial discretion.158 Furthermore, because
the guidelines do not require balancing an indeterminate list of factors, their
rigidity and clarity make them easier in application and setting precedents.159
Conversely, opponents find that inflexibility of the standard essentially
provides courts a mechanism to deny sterilization petitions without deeper
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inquiry into the specifics of an individual’s case.160 Critics also contend that
this standard may not be in the best interest of the incompetent.161 If a judge
finds that a case may not satisfy a requirement less relevant to the persons’
best interest, they may be forced to disregard other factors potentially more
impactful on an individual’s well-being.162 Additionally, from a right to
privacy standpoint, the standard’s strong presumption against sterilization
places such importance on the right to procreate that it ignores the
importance of the companion’s right not to procreate.163
C. Discretionary Best Interest Standard
The case of In re Terwilliger involved a legal guardian’s petition to
declare their ward incompetent and to have her involuntary sterilized.164
Mildred Terwilliger, described as mentally deficient,165 was illiterate at age
25, and gave birth to an illegitimate child shortly before trial proceedings
began.166 Mildred did not take responsibility for her child, who was under
the care of her parents.167 The court ruled that there was no applicable
statute at the time in Pennsylvania,168 and therefore it created a standard
beginning with procedural safeguards similar to those of Hayes and
Grady.169 Procedurally, the judge must first appoint a guardian ad litem to
advocate on behalf of the individual subject to the competency hearing.170
The court also requires the individual to undergo a “comprehensive medical,
psychological, and social evaluation.”171 The trial judge must meet with the
incompetent person to determine if their presence is required at the hearing,
where they must formulate an impression regarding their competency, and
then decide accordingly.172
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Following the competency hearing, the judge must make a number of
procedural findings.173 First, the judge must find “that the individual lacks
capacity to make a decision about sterilization and that the incapacity is not
likely to change in the foreseeable future.”174 Furthermore, the judge must
also find that the incompetent individual has the ability to reproduce and that
sterilization is the only reasonable method of contraception.175 Once the
above findings are made, the court will then determine if sterilization is in
the best interest of the incompetent individual. 176 To make this
determination, the Terwilliger court adopts the factors employed by the
Grady court.177 With regard to Mildred Terwilliger, the Terwilliger Court
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To determine those interests, the court should consider at least the following
factors: (1) The possibility that the incompetent person can, become pregnant.
There need be no showing that pregnancy is likely. The court can presume
fertility if the medical evidence indicates normal development of sexual organs
and the evidence does not otherwise raise doubts about fertility. (2) The
possibility that the incompetent person will experience trauma or psychological
damage if she becomes pregnant or gives birth, and, conversely, the possibility
of trauma or psychological damage from the sterilization operation. (3) The
likelihood that the individual will voluntarily engage in sexual activity or be
exposed to situations where sexual intercourse is imposed upon her. (4) The
inability of the incompetent person to understand reproduction or contraception
and the likely permanence of that inability. (5) The feasibility and medical
advisability of less drastic means of contraception, both at the present time’ and
under foreseeable future circumstances. (6) The advisability of sterilization at
the time of the application rather than in the future. While sterilization should
not be postponed until unwanted pregnancy occurs, the court should be cautious
not to authorize sterilization before it clearly has become an advisable
procedure. (7) The ability of the incompetent person to care for a child, or the
possibility that the incompetent may at some future date be able to marry and,
with a spouse, care for a child. (8) Evidence that scientific or medical advances
may occur within the foreseeable future which will make possible either
improvement of the individual’s condition or alternative and less drastic
sterilization procedures. (9) A demonstration that the proponents of sterilization
are seeking it in good faith and that their primary concern is for the best
interests of the incompetent person rather than their own or the public’s
convenience. These factors should each be given appropriate weight as the
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concurred with testimony given by Mildred’s father, family physician, and
Mildred herself indicated that Mildred lacked capacity to make her own
reproductive decisions.178 Furthermore, it is implied the Terwilliger court
recognized that Mildred’s inability to care for her illegitimate child without
aid from professionals and family proved that she did not understand the
consequences of sexual activity. 179 However, upon review of testimony
given by Mildred’s family physician, which indicated that birth control
mechanisms less drastic than sterilization may have sufficed,180 the court
found that the standard requiring sterilization to be the only feasible option
was not met and vacated the decision of the lower court, ordering a
remand.181
Advocates of the discretionary best interest analysis find the standard’s
flexibility advantageous, as the judges are granted wide discretion with their
decisions.182 This flexibility and broad discretion essentially forces judges
to consider the specific facts of each case so that their decision is
individually tailored to each unique situation. However, opponents of the
discretionary best interest standard find the flexibility as potentially
misleading in terms of precedent, as broad judicial discretion in such context
will “inevitably lead to inconsistent results.”183
D. Policy Considerations in State Law
Recent case law indicates that state standards providing for sterilization of
incompetent persons have developed uniformly to attend to the best interest
of the profoundly mentally disabled, and no longer established under
eugenic justifications.184 The differing approaches of varied state standards,
however, do reflect a legal uncertainty in light of the Supreme Court’s
silence on matters involving involuntary sterilization since Buck v. Bell and
Skinner v. Oklahoma.185 However, from a policy perspective, the state laws
regarding sterilization of incompetent or mentally disabled persons are
unvarying in their condemnation of eugenic sterilization and their assertion
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of the intent to act in the best interest of the individual at issue. 186
Additionally, since the rulings in most cases were decided following the
expansion of reproductive privacy as a fundamental right under the right to
privacy, most state decisions reflect reluctance to infringe on this right
through their standards.
The Court in Hayes acknowledges the influence of the eugenic movement
in early sterilization laws, and while it addresses the possibility that eugenic
sterilization may be constitutional, it also emphasizes the scientific
advancements subsequent to Buck v. Bell that disprove such theories.187 The
Court’s contention is that this removes any legitimate basis for arguments
supportive of improving society with eugenic sterilization laws.188 Its policy
concern is, instead, in regards to the best interest of the incompetent person,
and not the needs of society overall.189 In that respect, the Court recognizes
the unique complications the sterilization decision presents, in that unlike
with most other medical procedures, there is no guarantee that the child and
parent would share the same interest.190 In light of this recognition, the
Hayes court sees this as an example of an instance where it may be
necessary to distinguish the interests of mentally disabled persons from
those of a minor child in terms of sterilization law.191 For this reason, it
confines authorization of these procedures to the courts, declining to allow
guardians to consent to the sterilization in the same way they would for
many other procedures.192 The standard is a stringent reflection of the
Court’s reluctance to infringe on the right to privacy, granting the procedure
in the rare cases where it finds the most conclusive proof sterilization is in
the best interest of a particular incompetent person.193
Similarly, the court in Grady recognizes the history of abuse manifested in
the sterilization of incompetent persons prior to the decline of the eugenics
movement.194 Consequently, the Grady court expresses its intent to decide
instead in favor of the best interests of the incompetent.195 In light of this
recognition, Grady distinguishes the guidelines for sterilization from the
compulsory sterilization law of the past by redefining the classification of
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incompetent persons in accordance with the law.196 Refusing to classify
sterilization of incompetent persons as either voluntary or involuntary, the
Grady court creates a new category tailored to those who cannot consent for
the purposes of developing their legal standards. 197 Additionally, it
recognizes the constitutional right to privacy inherent in such issues, and
extends this right to privacy to expressly include the right to obtain
sterilization. 198 This provides citizens of their state extended protection
under the fundamental right to privacy, which does not specifically include
sterilization under Supreme Court precedent.199
In development of the discretionary best interest approach, the court in
Terwilliger also appreciates the gravity of sterilization as a procedure in
respect to permanence and intrusion on their right to privacy.200 Its analysis
differs slightly from Hayes and Grady in creating its respective approaches
through its focus on proper jurisdiction and employment of the doctrine of
parens patriae to decide on matters of sterilization. 201 The doctrine of
parens patriae, which authorizes the state to made decisions in the place of
guardians in certain situations, is here extended to include sterilization of
incompetent persons.202 In reservation of its rights of parens patriae on such
matters, the decision emphatically accentuates the obligations of the courts
to act with solely the best interest of the incompetent person in mind.203
E. State Level Implications on Buck v. Bell
Following Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court’s expansion of right to privacy
protections and societal shifts in public policy presented interesting
analytical implications for modern developments of state sterilization
standards. In some respects, recent case law reflects an adherence to the
rationale of Buck v. Bell, though it is fairly limited to maintaining strong
enforcement of procedural due process rights. The Virginia statute at issue in
Buck v. Bell remained in force because it provided procedural mechanisms
safeguarding due process rights.204 With respect to judicial emphasis on
ensuring the protections of procedural due process, standards developed in
state case law included similarly strong procedural requirements, intended to
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afford parallel protections.205 The mandatory criteria standard developed in
the Hayes opinion limits decisions concerning involuntary sterilization to
remain within the scope of court supervision.206 Additionally, the procedural
requirements in Hayes also include appointment of a guardian ad litem,
evaluations of the person by medical, social, and psychological experts,
reports on such evaluations, and efforts to obtain the viewpoint of the
incompetent as best possible.207
Similarly, Grady also requires appointing a guardian ad litem and various
expert evaluations of the incompetent person, in addition to a court hearing
and requirement that the judge meet with the allegedly incompetent
person. 208 The standard developed in Terwilliger echoes this procedural
approach, including an express requirement of due notice along with
appointment of a guardian, evaluations, and court hearing. 209 Similar
requirements for court hearings, guardian, and expert evaluations are also
found in the substituted judgment standard as adapted by the court in Moe.210
Though state courts follow Buck v. Bell closely in terms of ensuring
procedural safeguards, a clear deviation emerges in terms of the policy
driving court rationale, and the standards of scrutiny employed for purposes
of judicial review. The 1924 Virginia statute was drafted for the purpose of
improving society through eugenic methods, 211 and relevant substantive
discussion in Buck v. Bell accepted, to an extent, such motivations.212 Since
many states started to repeal their eugenic sterilization laws enacted around
or following the Buck v. Bell decision beginning in the 1960’s and
continuing through the 1980’s,213 more recent state law indicated a divergent
trend in the underlying policy for authorizing compulsory sterilization. Court
opinions specified a shift in their chief concerns away from general societal
welfare, and towards acting in the best interest of the incompetent person.214
This shift from an emphasis on overall societal welfare to protection of
individual privacy is further evident through the identity of the petitioners
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seeking the sterilization. In Buck v. Bell and Skinner v. Oklahoma, state
actors sought the sterilization of incompetent persons, respectively the
Virginia mental institutions and the Oklahoma legislature.215 In more recent
state cases like Hayes and Grady, the facts concerned involve the family
members or guardians of the incompetent person seeking sterilization.216
This indicates that the policies are better applicable to individual liberties
and allow for a stronger focus onto sterilization as in the best interest.
In conjunction with the expansion of the right to privacy, developments
post Buck v. Bell with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of substantive due
process allowed the states less leniency in laws that could potentially abridge
newly protected personal rights.217 Judge Holmes evaluated the substantive
due process claim in Buck v. Bell under the rational basis test,218 which
required only proof that the law could rationally relate to a legitimate
government interest.219 The Supreme Court has since required heightened
scrutiny in cases where a law would infringe on what is deemed to be a
fundamental right.220 By the time many state courts developed the current
standards for sterilization of incompetent persons, the Supreme Court had
extended the right to privacy to include procreation as a fundamental
right.221 Since any law infringing on a fundamental right may only be
upheld if they are “narrowly drawn” to serve a “compelling state interest,”222
more recent sterilization laws were held to a higher standard of scrutiny than
the Virginia statute at issue in Buck v. Bell. 223 It was therefore a
combination of the heightened scrutiny and expansion of fundamental rights
that accounted for the deviation of modern case law from the Buck v. Bell
approach to an analysis of substantive due process claims.
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III. MARY MOE AND THE MODERN BACKLASH
The most recent court decision regarding involuntary sterilization
concerned the pregnancy of a severely mentally ill thirty-two-year old
woman, referred to in court documents as “Mary Moe” for the purposes of
confidentiality. 224 As previously indicated, since the 1982 In re Moe
decision, Massachusetts has followed the substituted judgment approach
when authorizing sterilization. 225 In applying the substituted judgment
approach, “[t]he court ‘dons the mental mantle of the incompetent’ and
substitutes itself as nearly as possible for the individual in the decision
making process.”226
A. The Trial Court Decision and Sterilization Order
The facts of the case indicate that Mary Moe, a schizophrenic, suffers
from bipolar mood disorder.227 Prior to the events outlined, Mary Moe “has
been pregnant twice before.”228 The first pregnancy was terminated, and the
second resulted in the birth of a boy who is in the custody of Mary Moe’s
parents.229 Mary Moe made a number of erroneous and erratic statements at
a competency hearing on December 9, 2011.230 She denied being pregnant
and claimed to have previously met the judge, who stated that she and Moe
have never met.231 Moe also claimed to be a devout Catholic and opposed to
abortion, asserting that she would never have one.232 The parents of Moe,
conversely, “have stated that [Moe] is not an ‘active’ Catholic.” 233
Following this hearing, Judge Christina L. Harms, then of the Massachusetts
Probate and Family Court found Moe to be severely delusional and thus
“incompetent to make a decision about an abortion.”234
Judge Harms appointed a guardian to prepare an investigative report on
Moe’s condition, focusing on the issue of substituted judgment as set out in
Massachusetts law under ALM GL ch. 190B § 5-306A.235 This statute
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prevents guardians of minor children or incompetent persons from
consenting on their behalf to treatment plans unless the court both finds in
applying the substituted judgment standard that the person would consent if
competent, and expressly approves that specific treatment or procedure.236
Furthermore, under the substituted judgment standard the statute requires the
court to hold a hearing before authorizing any treatment.237
In the course of this investigation, the guardian consulted a doctor about
possible risks posed to the fetus presented by Mary Moe’s schizophrenia
medication.238 According to the report, Mary Moe was recommended to
discontinue use of her medication as it would harm unborn children.239
While Judge Harms weighed all relevant factors to determine how Mary
Moe would choose to proceed with the pregnancy if competent, in applying
the substituted judgment standard, she found the discontinuation of some of
Mary Moe’s antipsychotic medication to prevent harming the fetus to be the
most compelling factor.240 In an open letter later published in a Boston area
legal journal,241 Judge Harms explained:
As Probate and Family Court judges, we deal regularly with
mental health issues, and know that people with untreated or
poorly controlled schizophrenia commit suicide at far greater rates
than the rest of the population. That Mary Moe’s pregnancy and
resultant medication reduction puts her at substantial risk of killing
or harming herself in the coming months seemed important to me.
I formed the judgment that religion would be a lesser
consideration for Mary Moe than her own safety and well-being. I
viewed the interruption of Mary’s full medicinal regimen as
potentially life-threatening. If Mary understood this, which my
observation of her behavior, demeanor, and responses indicated
that she did not, I believed then, as I do now, that she would elect
to abort the pregnancy in order to protect her own well-being.242
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Thus, because removing Mary Moe from her medication could have grim
consequences to her health, Judge Harms ruled that had Mary Moe been able
to understand such consequences, she would have elected to terminate the
pregnancy and agree to sterilization.243 Under this application, Judge Harms
employed the Massachusetts substituted judgment standard requiring Mary
Moe to obtain an abortion and undergo compulsory sterilization.244
B. Appellate Response and Media Firestorm
Following the decision of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court,
the case of Mary Moe went before the Massachusetts Appeals Court.245
Here, the appellate court agreed with the Probate and Family Court that the
substituted judgment approach was the correct standard, but disagreed with
Judge Harms’ application. 246 According to the Appeals Court, the
substituted judgment standard requires a determination of how the person
would decide if competent, and does not consider what decision would
actually be in the best interest of that individual.247 On these grounds, the
Appeals Court stressed the importance of the “actual preference” of Mary
Moe on the matter, and in finding that Mary Moe was consistent in her
refusal to undergo an abortion, concluded that she would refuse an abortion
if not incompetent.248 In light of that determination, the Appeals Court
remanded in part with regards to the abortion order and reversed in part in
terms of the sterilization order.249 In reversing the sterilization order, the
Appeals Court contended that because the order was authorized in
conjunction with the abortion directive, Mary Moe was denied due process
as required by the Fourteenth Amendment.250
Shortly after the appellate ruling, the case of Mary Moe attracted the
attention of various advocacy groups and politicians, inciting a media
firestorm.251 The story ran in local news outlets like the Boston Globe as
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well as national news services like NBC and Associated Press.252 The press
coverage caught the attention of the legal community on the internet when
the case was featured on a well-known legal blog, Above The Law.253 As
the story gained popularity on the internet, entertainment blogs published
dramatized accounts of the case online. For example, written specifically for
its largely female audience, the blog Jezebel, owned by Gawker Media,
published a particularly dramatic and inflammatory piece on the Mary Moe
incident entitled, “Horrible Judge Tries to Force Schizophrenic Woman to
Get Abortion, Be Sterilized.”254
In an open letter published following the media backlash, Judge Harms
defended her decision to order the abortion and sterilization.255 Along with
addressing her focus on Mary Moe’s safety and well-being, Judge Harms
contended that, aside from ruling with regard to Mary Moe’s best interest,
her reasoning did follow the standard of substituted judgment.256 In defense
of her substituted judgment analysis, Judge Harms wrote:
Apart from being life-threatening, schizophrenia is probably the
most devastating among all the mental illnesses, in terms of human
suffering. As we know, people with untreated or poorly controlled
schizophrenia often stop bathing, shaving, washing their hair,
wearing shoes, and using toilets to urinate or defecate. The right
combination of medications ameliorates these common symptoms,
often to a remarkable degree, sometimes to at least a satisfactory
degree. If Mary Moe’s schizophrenia may worsen to the point that
she suffers from some or all of these common symptoms, what
would be her substituted judgment?257
Following her defense of her application of the substituted judgment
standard in the Mary Moe case, Judge Harms continued her letter to address
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the contention that she had failed to provide due process, explaining that
there had in fact been a hearing where Mary Moe was present.258
In light of the decision of the Massachusetts Appeals Court and the
statements of Judge Harms, the issues here are illustrative of the longstanding emphasis on ensuring enforcement of procedural protections as
afforded by due process rights. The focal point of the appellate ruling
focused on the affordance of the procedural protections of the Massachusetts
standard, which included the requirement of considering the actual
preference of the incompetent and either a evidentiary hearing or judicial
findings based on documented evidence, 259 as actually applied to Mary
Moe.260 This is evident in their focus on Judge Harm’s assessment of Mary
Moe’s opposition to terminating her pregnancy or undergoing sterilization
on religious grounds in adherence of Catholic dogma.261 Contending that
the Judge did not hold a hearing and disregarded Mary Moe’s opposition to
abortion by way of Catholic belief, 262 the appellate court found that
inadequate efforts to ascertain actual preference indicated that Mary Moe
was not afforded full procedural protection.263 This scrutiny of procedural
safeguards indicates a continuation of the emphasis on safeguarding
protections of procedural due process.
IV. LEGACY OF PRECEDENT IN BUCK V. BELL
The following analysis addresses the separate focus on personal rights
under procedural and substantive due process. This analysis shows a
steadfast adherence towards the enforcement of procedural safeguards on
due process. Additionally, this discussion examines the impact of later
standards for evaluation of substantive due process rights, affording
sterilization laws higher levels of scrutiny not yet available under Buck v.
Bell.
A. Inclusion of Due Process Rights as Binding Authority
In large part, the Buck v. Bell decision focused on the compliance of the
Virginia statute with procedural due process requirements as set out by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 264 To refresh, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment states that: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”265 Satisfaction of
procedural due process generally requires legal safeguards such as
mandatory hearings and notification to be included in statutes governing the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.266 Therefore it is important to note
that in drafting the Virginia statute at issue in Buck v. Bell, lawmakers
crafted the legislation with an active effort to include procedural safeguards
that would comport with the requirements imposed by due process.267 The
statute itself required that in order to impose compulsory sterilization on an
inmate of a qualifying state institution, a petition must be filed with a board
specially created to review such cases, and the incompetent person to be
sterilized must be notified, appointed a guardian, and afforded a hearing and
opportunity to appeal.268
Justice Holmes found the requirement of procedural due process
satisfactory in Buck v. Bell in light of such safeguards designed to address
the rights of Carrie Buck and other patients at such institutions before
depriving her of her reproductive liberty through administering the
involuntary sterilization.269 Since Carrie Buck had been actually afforded
every procedural protection as required by the statute, the court found that
her legal right to due process had not been violated.270 This part of the
opinion is expressly binding, in light of later interpretation of sterilization
law at the state level. In the more recent January 2012 decision in
Guardianship of Moe, the opinion of the Massachusetts Court of Appeals
was entirely concerned with ensuring that Mary Moe was afforded her full
procedural rights under state statute in ordering her sterilization, and did not
address in detail the substantive elements of the Massachusetts substituted
judgment standard from an analytical perspective of the standard itself.271
Since the court found that because the judge did not hold the mandatory
hearing or provide the necessary alternative evidence, and ordered the
sterilization without adequate notice, Mary Moe did not receive the
procedural protections afforded to her by law.272 On these grounds, they
found that the due process required under the Fourteenth Amendment was
not provided, and overruled the sterilization order.273 The focus on ensuring
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receipt of the full protections as required under the due process clause in
Guardianship of Moe indicates that the stipulation in Buck v. Bell that
requires involuntary sterilization statutes to include and exercise such
procedural protections is binding law.
Conversely, it is much harder to argue that the Buck v. Bell approach to
substantive due process is binding authority, in light of subsequent evolution
of the standards of judicial review and protections under the right to privacy.
As discussed in greater detail in Part II, Buck v. Bell was decided in 1927,
decades before the courts classified reproductive autonomy as a fundamental
right,274 and before the development and adaptation of heightened standards
of judicial review.275 At the time, the only standard for judicial review of
law with regard to substantive due process issues was the rational basis test,
which requires that the statute or regulation be somehow related to a
legitimate government interest.276 It is important to note that rational basis
only requires that the law be potentially supportive of any legitimate
government interest.277 Note that the rational test basis does not mandate
that the interest cited be an actual interest of the government, nor does it
require proof that the legislation was created with that interest in mind.278 In
applying this standard, Justice Holmes’ contention indicates the view that
there is a legitimate state interest in reducing the burden of incompetent
persons on government resources. 279 Though the legislative intent of
lawmakers indicates that the sterilization statute could reflect such an
interest,280 this does not mean that Justice Holmes’ support for eugenicist
policies as a legitimate government interest is immortalized as binding
authority. In fact, one recent scholar acknowledged the difficulty that
modern courts would face if they would attempt to use Buck v. Bell to
establish eugenic sterilization as a legitimate state interest, specifically in
cases involving hereditary genetic defects.281
Rather, the strong presumption against such drastic measures seems to
indicate that Justice Holmes’ recognition of eugenic sterilization as a
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legitimate government interest is dicta. A close reading of his argument
reveals that his application of the Virginia law to the potential interest of
societal improvement through eugenic sterilization is vague. Holmes wrote,
in regards to that interest, “we cannot say as a matter of law that the grounds
do not exist, and if they exist they justify the result.”282
B. Impact of Dicta in Buck v. Bell Analysis of Substantive Due Process
1. Dicta Generally
While there is no conclusive authority or standard for guiding distinction
between dicta and holding,283 dicta is traditionally defined to characterize
judicial statements “not necessary to the decision of the case.” 284 The
traditional definition is frustratingly impractical to apply in distinguishing
dicta from holding as it provides no specific guidance for statements made in
case rationale.285 Case law offers little clarification on the matter,286 but
dicta has been determined to include deliberate asides, discussion
broadening a legal principle beyond the scope of the case, and components
of the case rationale that are not determinative of the outcome.287 The
doctrine of stare decisis, a central to the United States common law system,
binds lower courts to adhere to the holdings of higher courts.288 Though stare
decisis does not compel the lower courts to follow the dictum of the higher
courts, courts can and do regard the dicta with varying levels of
persuasiveness.289
The ambiguous distinction between dicta and binding opinion requires a
further analysis, assessing succeeding legal attitudes following the dicta.290
In some cases, more persuasive dicta may evolve into law through
subsequent judicial opinions or uniform adherence by lower courts. 291
Conversely, dicta may also be dismissed entirely, either expressly through
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later statements of the original court, or implicitly, through a succession of
court rulings rejecting the dicta. 292 The persuasiveness of some dicta
remains ambiguous, as it is neither adapted into law nor clearly rejected, as
lower court interpretations reach assorted decisions, often choosing to
disregard dicta altogether.293 Therefore, in analyzing the binding effect of a
statement, subsequent legal treatment can be telling in the determination
between holding and dicta.
2. Dicta With Regard to Buck v. Bell
In addressing Carrie Buck’s contentions that her substantive due process
rights were violated, Justice Holmes applies the rational basis standard of
review to the Virginia statute mandating her sterilization.294 Note that the
Supreme Court’s various phrasings of the rational basis standard require the
law to be somewhat relevant to any legitimate state interest, regardless of the
specific legislative intent in drafting the law.295 The Virginia institution in
Buck v. Bell recognized that while compulsory sterilization would deprive
Carrie Buck of her liberty, it was in the interest of benefiting society,
contending that mental disability or feeble-mindedness is hereditary.296 In
analyzing such a claim as a legitimate government interest, Justice Holmes
stated, “we cannot say as a matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if
they exist they justify the result.” 297 Close reading of this statement
indicates that while Justice Holmes was not rejecting outright a government
interest in promoting eugenics, he was not expressly confirming such an
interest either. Instead, this statement confirms that a legitimate state interest
for such a law is potentially in existence. The holding here, is that because
the statute could relate to a legitimate state objective, Carrie Buck’s right to
substantive due process was not violated.
In defining what is dicta and what is holding, incorporating the doctrine of
issue preclusion is essential towards determining what is essential to the
facts of the case, and what is not.298 This requires identifying what is
actually at issue, as either a matter of fact or law.299 It is important to note
that the attack was not on the legitimacy of the state objective, as the
contention at issue was that “in no circumstances could such an order be
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justified.”300 The holding, then, was not concerned with the legitimacy of
that state interest, but instead whether or not a state interest was possible at
all. Therefore, the holding is limited to the assertion that there was a
conceivable legitimate purpose, and as a result, Carrie Buck’s due process
rights were not violated.
The holding does not include more abstract discussion of the overall
worldwide benefits of mandatory sterilization policies. Justice Holmes’
subsequent discussion broadens beyond the focus on the potential existence
or non-existence of a legitimate government interest. Transitioning into a
moralistic digression, the discussion widened the scope considerably, as
evident through the statement, “[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”301 While this is a blatant endorsement of eugenicist
policies, it is also dicta. These statements broaden in scope, in contrast with
their discussion specific to the Virginia law, where the language is vague
and does not take the clear opportunity to confirm eugenic sterilization as a
legitimate state interest. Instead, this endorsement is confined to an aside,
which broadens the scope to a more general perspective, engaging in a
theoretical and idealistic testimonial no longer tailored to the Virginia
statute. Thus, since dicta includes statements found in the rationale but not
essential to the outcome of the case,302 it is material that the decision reached
could be made without this fierce defense of eugenic policy as a legitimate
government interest.
3. Dicta as Reflective of Societal Attitude
Failure to separate dicta from binding authority is dangerous because it
allows courts, if mistaking dicta for the binding authority of the holding, to
bind later courts to judicial attitudes no longer reflective of modern
society.303 While dicta is not law binding later courts to adherence, it is still
persuasive authority that, as history indicates, is not easily overlooked or
questioned, as lower courts are not inclined to examine it with much
diligence. 304 Appellate judges often successfully utilize this tendency
towards reliance as a way to plant their broader ideological views into the
law in order to attempt to ensure some later adherence. 305 It logically
follows then that dicta is a reflection of judicial attitude pertaining to the
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time period in which the case was decided, which, in turn, provides insight
into the overall societal views present in that specific era. Holmes himself
has written that judicial interpretation of the law is not entirely reached
through pure logical analysis, but instead has more to do with the “felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories [and] even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men.”306 Here, Justice
Holmes recognized that legal concepts shift over time as attitudes change in
society.
Using Holmes’ own logic, it is best to adhere to what is predictable and
constant in terms of later interpretations. History has shown, an emphasis on
the procedural due process element rather than Holmes’ focus on protecting
society’s right to weed out genetic inferiority. This flexibility present in the
growth and adjustment of legal concepts, is, according to Holmes, “both
inevitable and desirable, enabling the law to adapt to new knowledge, to
technological developments, and to changing social mores and values.”307
Legal and societal views on sterilization and contraceptive issues as they
relate to the mentally disabled have evolved, as later interpretations of the
law explicitly disregard eugenic justifications for administering sterilization
in favor of providing for the general welfare of the mentally disabled or
incompetent.308 In light of the current legal trends, as reflected through the
various state standards, it can hardly be argued that Holmes’ endorsement of
a moral and ethical obligation to regulate reproduction to avoid overtaxing
the welfare system is anything more than marginally persuasive dicta.
Instead, because the opposite trend prevails, there is a heavy presumption
against involuntary sterilization and it is not widely granted. In light of the
recent events of the Mary Moe case in Massachusetts, we see that the
emphasis on procedural due process rights is intact, indicating that this part
of Buck v. Bell was, in fact, binding authority. The policy rationale behind
such sterilization procedures clearly favors the interest and general well
being of the disabled person, and not the strength of the gene pool. This
attitude is reflected clearly in the events of the recent Guardianship of Moe,
where the trial judge’s motivations for originally granting the sterilization
were explicitly to protect Mary Moe’s best interest.309 This indicates that,
since such a focus on fair procedure has held steadfast, and the eugenicist
principles have, in fact, not. Holmes’ inflammatory view, therefore, was
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never actually regarded as binding authority. Rather, it is an ideological
remnant of long-abandoned perspectives that remains dicta, and dicta alone.
CONCLUSION
Buck v. Bell has long been a subject of legal criticism and public stigma,
despite no subsequent efforts to overturn the law. Instead, the United States
Supreme Court has largely declined to address Buck v. Bell and most
involuntary sterilization statues, shifting its focus towards the inclusion of
reproductive rights under the right to privacy. Following a mass repeal of
state statutes authorizing eugenic sterilization in furtherance of societal
benefits, states’ current sterilization statutes reflect an interest in individual
protections, defending compliance with the protections afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The inflammatory legacy of Buck v. Bell is largely unfounded. Instead,
public revulsion towards Buck v. Bell is a product of societal sensitivity
towards eugenicist-based policies and an expansion of the protections under
the right to privacy. A closer reading of the decision indicates an emphasis
on procedural due process, requiring states to afford procedural safeguards
in such statutes. Since Holmes’ broad theoretical endorsement of eugenics
is tangential to the substantive due process analysis, it is dicta, and merely
indicative of societal attitudes of the time. Most telling is the subsequent
focus of case law on creating strong procedural safeguards, which, in
conjunction with a shift in societal rejection of eugenic sterilization policies.
This indicates largely, that the inflammatory defense of eugenics is in fact,
dicta, and not binding authorization of eugenics as a constant legitimate state
interest. The impact of this is already evident in modern state sterilization,
which present standards so strict they act as an effective safeguard by
creating hurdles for granting sterilization. Recognition of Holmes’
inflammatory statements as dicta will only further these efforts, no longer
allowing stringent state laws to hide behind a strict reading of Buck v. Bell.
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

